Blockchain as a Service for Multi-Access Edge Computing: A Deep
  Reinforcement Learning Approach by Nguyen, Dinh C et al.
Blockchain as a Service for Multi-Access Edge
Computing: A Deep Reinforcement Learning
Approach
Dinh C. Nguyen1, Pubudu N. Pathirana1, Ming Ding2, Aruna Seneviratne3
1School of Engineering, Deakin University, Waurn Ponds, VIC 3216, Australia
2Data61, CSIRO, Australia
3School of Electrical Engineering and Telecommunications, UNSW, NSW, Australia
Email: {cdnguyen, pubudu.pathirana}@deakin.edu.au, ming.ding@data61.csiro.au, a.seneviratne@unsw.edu.au
Abstract—Recently, blockchain has gained momentum in the
academic community thanks to its decentralization, immutability,
transparency and security. As an emerging paradigm, Multi-
access Edge Computing (MEC) has been widely used to provide
computation and storage resources to mobile user equipments
(UE) at the edge of the network for improving the perfor-
mance of mobile applications. In this paper, we propose a
novel blockchain-based MEC architecture where UEs can offload
their computation tasks to the MEC servers. In particular,
a blockchain network is deployed and hosted on the MEC
platform as Blockchain as a Service (BaaS) that supports smart
contract-based resource trading and transaction mining services
for mobile task offloading. To enhance the performance of the
blockchain-empowered MEC system, we propose a joint scheme
of computation offloading and blockchain mining. Accordingly,
an optimization problem is formulated to maximize edge service
revenue and blockchain mining reward while minimizing the
service computation latency with respect to constraints of user
service demands and hash power resource. We then propose
a novel Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) approach using
a double deep Q-network (DQN) algorithm to solve the pro-
posed problem. Numerical results demonstrate that the proposed
scheme outperforms the other baseline methods in terms of better
system utility with computational efficiency. Experiment results
also verify that the trading contract design is efficient with low
operation cost, showing the feasibility of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Blockchain, Multi-access Edge Computing
(MEC), smart contract, offloading, blockchain mining, Deep
Reinforcement Learning (DRL).
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed the explosion of mobile tech-
nologies with the proliferation of user equipments (UEs)
such as smartphones, tablets, wearable devices, etc, which
have been driving the evolution of Internet of Things (IoT)
[1]. UEs can be employed to run IoT applications such as
smart home, smart healthcare, smart city with high flexibility
and efficiency [2]. However, due to the rapid growth of
mobile data traffic in mobile networks, i.e. 5G and beyond,
executing extensive IoT applications merely on overloaded
UEs is incapable of providing satisfactory Quality of Services
(QoS) to users. Fortunately, the recent advances of mobile
*This work was supported by CSIRO Data61, Australia.
edge technologies enable UEs to offload their computation-
extensive tasks (i.e. data and programming codes) to Mobile
Edge Computing servers with a close proximity to UEs.
Mobile Edge Computing was conceptualized by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) Industry Spec-
ification Group (ISG) as a means of extending intelligence
to the edge of the network along with better computing and
storage capabilities. Since 2017, the ETSI industry group
renamed it to Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC), because
the MEC technology brought benefits beyond mobile devices
and to Wi-Fi/fixed access technologies [3]. The underlying
concept of MEC is to extend cloud computing capabilities
to the edge of cellular networks. This solution potentially
reduces computation pressure on devices and provides ultra-
low latency mobile services to satisfy the ever-increasing
computation demands of modern UEs. As in previous works
[4], [5], [6], many approaches using MEC have been proposed
to improve IoT offloading performances from various aspects,
such as computation efficiency, resource allocation and user
selection.
Although MEC plays an important role in IoT offloading,
some critical challenges remain unsolved. First, it is insecure
for UEs to perform large-scale offloading to MEC servers
in untrusted and non-transparent environments. Second, MEC
servers may not be willing to participate as computation
service suppliers for UEs’s offloading requests due to unfair
resource allocation [5], which potentially degrades the avail-
ability of edge computing services. Thirdly, in the traditional
computation offloading procedure, there is the need for a third-
party intermediary to take the role of controlling resource
trading (i.e. offloading payment). However, this architecture
remains single-point failure issues when the intermediary is
out of service as well as privacy bottlenecks due to curious
third parties [7].
Blockchain that is a decentralized public ledger with high
security capabilities has emerged as a promising solution to
overcome these challenges [7]. The key concept of blockchain
is based on a peer-to-peer network architecture in which
transaction information is distributed among multiple nodes
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and not controlled by any single centralized entity. Specially,
the blockchain network can be deployed and hosted on a MEC
platform as Blockchain as a Service (BaaS) which enables
blockchain-related services such as user access monitoring,
transaction mining, and ledger network management [7]. BaaS
with its decentralized and trustworthy capabilities has been
considered for MEC systems for security guarantees such as
offloading traceability [8], secure resource trading [9] and
smart contract-based access control [10].
A. Related works
Many research efforts are directed to the design of MEC
offloading with blockchain. The authors in [8] considered
a blockchain-enabled computation offloading framework in
multi-user MEC where task offloading time, energy con-
sumption and maintaining load balance are optimized with
respect to data integrity guarantees using blockchain. The
work in [9] focused on solving resource trading issues by
taking advantage of a smart contract which enables intelli-
gent resource management and high security for the involved
offloading systems. To solve the problem of resource scarcity
during the offloading on MEC, the authors in [11] proposed a
joint framework of coin-loaning and computation-offloading
for blockchain-empowered MEC. The key objective is to
minimize users’ costs (i.e. energy consumption and network
latency) by leveraging a game theory approach. Further, to
achieve better resource management for multiple access mo-
bile edge computing on blockchain, an economic approach was
proposed in [5] to optimize the blockchain mining rewards of
mobile miners through a Stackelberg game model.
In comparison to such approaches, Reinforcement Learning
(RL) [12] emerges as a strong alternative to solve offloading
problems. However, the technical characteristics of multi-user
MEC can make it challenging to apply RL, as the dimension
of state and action space increases exponentially with the
increasing number of users. Deep Reinforcement Learning
(DRL) approaches such as deep Q-network (DQN) [13] have
been employed to solve the above complicated problems.
Our works [14, 15] implemented mobile blockchain-edge
offloading frameworks using DRL with the main objective
of minimizing computation cost and enhancing user privacy
levels. The works [16, 17] employed DRL to build offloading
algorithms for mining tasks and data processing tasks in
blockchain.
Although the literature works have addressed blockchain-
based MEC offloading issues, there remains some critical
issues that need to be solved. First, in most current studies
[8], [16-17], MEC servers are always allocated randomly hash
power resource for block mining regardless of their computa-
tion contributions, which leads to the unfairness among MEC
servers. Further, considering the complex MEC system with
multiple MEC servers and UEs (i.e. in 5G scenarios), the state
and action space would be very large, which poses challenges
for effectively solving the optimization problem. Besides, the
existing approaches require static operating models [9], [11-
12] which need to be updated over time. These schemes do not
scale well when the dimension of the MEC system increases
with the increase the number of MEC servers and UEs associ-
ated with a larger number of configuration parameters. Final,
the current DRL-based schemes [14-17] have not considered
the joint design of computation offloading and blockchain
mining, which has significant impacts on the performance of
blockchain-empowered multi-user MEC systems.
B. Contributions
Different from the literature works, in this paper, we propose
a new blockchain-based mutative MEC system for supporting
computation offloading by using BaaS services, including
shared transaction ledgers, smart contracts, and transaction
consensus. UEs can submit their offloading requests to the
blockchain by establishing a transaction which is transmitted
to MEC servers via blockchain ledgers for traceability and
security. Moreover, smart contracts are leveraged to enable
reliable resource trading (i.e. payment) between UEs and MEC
servers without the need for any intermediary. MEC servers
use their resources to execute the offloaded tasks. Given the
resource constraints of mobile devices, we introduce an edge
mining solution which enables MEC servers to participate
in the consensus process for extra profits through mining
rewards. In particular, we propose a reputation mechanism
that evaluates the computation contribution of MEC servers
to adjust adaptively the resource allocation in the MEC net-
work. This solution would accelerate the mining process and
encourage more MEC servers to participate in the offloading
process for improving network robustness. Further, we also
apply the Software Defined Networking technology to provide
logical control to our MEC architecture. The DRL unit is
also deployed on the SDN controller that provides a holistic
overview of the network states to better manage offloading
and mining services. We consider that the system performance
is constrained by users’ service demands and resource (i.e.
hash power) of MEC servers. Then, the user selection and
resource allocation are formulated as a joint optimization
problem. We then propose a novel deep reinforcement learning
(DRL) scheme using a double DQN algorithm to solve the
proposed problem. The simulation results verify the high
performance of our proposed algorithm, compared to other
baseline approaches.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as
follows.
1) We propose a new multi-access edge computing (MEC)
architecture with blockchain for multi-user networks. To
enhance the performance of the blockchain-empowered
MEC system, we propose a joint scheme of computa-
tion offloading and blockchain mining. Particularly, we
leverage a smart contract to support transparent resource
trading for computation offloading, while a reputation
mechanism is designed to accelerate the mining process.
2) We formulate an optimization problem that aims to maxi-
mize edge service revenue and blockchain mining reward
while minimizing the service computation latency with
User Equipments 
(UE)
MEC servers
SDN Controller
DRL Unit
Blockchain
Account
Smart 
contract
Fig. 1: The proposed blockchain-empowered MEC system.
respect to the constraints of user service demands and
hash power resource.
3) Then, we propose a novel Deep Reinforcement Learning
approach using a double DQN algorithm to solve the pro-
posed problem. Numerical simulation results demonstrate
that the proposed scheme yields the best system utility
performance with minimal computation complexity, com-
pared with the other baselines. Experiment results also
verify the efficiency of the smart contract design with
low operation costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the BaaS service used in our work and describes
the system concept. We then present the system formulation
in terms of computation offloading and blockchain mining in
Section III. We detail the proposed DRL scheme and present a
double DQN algorithm to solve the proposed problem in Sec-
tion IV. Section V presents simulation results and discussions
on the obtained results, and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
In this section, we explain the BaaS terminology used in
our work and then introduce the system concept.
A. Blockchain as a Service for MEC
In our paper, a blockchain network is deployed and hosted
on a MEC platform as Blockchain as a Service (BaaS). In
particular, BaaS can offer a number of blockchain-enabled
services to support mobile applications.
• Shared ledger: It represents a database that is shared and
distributed among edge network participants (i.e. UEs and
MEC servers). The shared ledger records transactions that
contain request information of UEs (i.e. user ID) and
offloading information among UEs and MEC servers (i.e.
service demand, data size). Importantly, the shared ledger
interconnects the MEC servers in a secure manner, and
each MEC server has an equal role in managing the MEC
network without the need of external authorities accord-
ing to the blockchain concept. Thus, the use of shared
transaction ledger via blockchain eliminates single-point
failure risks faced by traditional MEC systems [4], [6].
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for task offloading to the 
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The UE pays fees (coins) 
to the edge  service 
provider and offload 
tasks to the MEC servers
The MEC servers compete 
to mine the block for extra 
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(6)
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Fig. 2: The system concept.
• Shared smart contract: Blockchain also offers smart
contract services for computation offloading. In specific,
we use a smart contract as an intelligent middle layer
to implement reliable resource trading, and UEs can
perform payment to the edger service provider (ESP)
through their blockchain account. An advantage of a
smart contract is the transparency that means both UEs
and ESPs can monitor and trace the payment process via
shared transactions on the blockchain.
• Consensus: Our BaaS model also provides a consensus
service on the MEC platform that is highly necessary
for our MEC system in improving blockchain consis-
tency and ensuring high network security. By using a
reputation score mechanism based on data computation
contributions, the MEC servers can compete together to
join the block mining process for extra profits (i.e. reward
in coins). Details of the concept will be explained in the
following section.
B. System concept
We propose a mobile cloud architecture as shown in Fig.
1. Without loss of generality, we assume that there are M
MEC servers, denoted as M = {1, 2, ...,M}. They provide
computation services for UEs and also perform blockchain
consensus for obtaining rewards. We consider a set of UEs
denoted as U = {1, 2, ..., U}, and each UE can offload its
computation tasks to the MEC servers for execution. Each MD
has a blockchain account to join the blockchain network and
perform trading which is enabled by a smart contract called
trading contract. We elaborate on the detailed operations of
the proposed scheme in Fig. 2 and explained as follows.
(1) System initialization: Each UE u needs to register with
the blockchain network to become a legitimate participant with
a uniquely identified address Idu. By creating a blockchain
account, which includes a private key SKu to sign the trans-
action and public key PKu for user identification [13], the UE
u can join the blockchain network. To realize the transactions
of edge offloading, the UE u also needs to get a wallet address
Wu. As a result, the transaction detail of each UE u can be
expressed by a variable tuple (Idu, SKu, PKu,Wu), which
is used when performing an offloading request to the MEC
servers.
(2) Offloading to the MEC servers: This process includes
three phases: resource trading, edge computation and calcula-
tion of reputation score. First, to be served by the MEC servers,
the UE u needs to send a transaction containing an offloading
request to the MEC servers. This is done by triggering the
trading contract, which acts as a middle layer to verify the
transaction (checking User ID, account balance) (see Steps 1,2
in Fig. 2). Details of the operation of our smart contract can
be found in our recent work [10]. Then, the contract performs
resource trading that means the user pays a certain fee (in
coins) for the edge service provider (ESP) based on the service
demand (Step 2 in Fig. 2). After successful payment, the UE
now can offload its tasks to the MEC servers for execution.
Then, the SDN controller calculates the reputation score of
each MEC server according to the service latency (see Steps
3,4,5 in Fig. 2).
(2) Block mining: Based on the reputation score, the SDN
controller will allocate an appropriate hash power resource for
each MEC server to perform mining. The MEC server with a
higher reputation value will be allocated more hash resources
for mining. Then, the new block is mined and appended into
the blockchain (see Steps 6,7 in Fig. 2).
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We assume that each UE u has a computation task to be
executed, denoted as Ru = (du, ξu, τu) where du is the size
of a task (in bits), ξu is the number of CPU cycles of the task
Ru (service demand), and τu is the desired execution time
to complete the task computation. Such information is known
to the UE before the task is computed [11]. We denote µ as
the price unit for computing services and this is charged by
the ESP during resource trading. We consider realistic IoT
scenarios such as healthcare [10] where complex data tasks
(i.e. image extraction or video decoding) should be offloaded
to MEC servers for efficient computation. Here we focus on
formulation of the edge offloading and block mining for our
blockchain-based MEC system.
A. Offloading to MEC servers
The offloading process is divided into three phases, namely
resource trading, edge computation and score reputation eval-
uation.
Resource trading cost: To perform data offloading to the
MEC servers, the UE u needs to pay the service cost of
executing its task to the ESP during the resource trading via
the trading contract. This is also regarded as the revenue of the
MEC system from computation services. Based on the service
demand ξu and unit price µ, the service cost charged by the
ESP to serve the UE u is calculated as
φu = µξu. (1)
Edge computation: We model the edge computation cost for
executing data tasks from UEs. Note that the edge execution
happens only when the resource trading is completed. Consid-
ering that latency is far more important than the energy metric
in analyzing the edge computation [5, 14], then we focus on
analyzing the task latency metric in our MEC formulation.
We denote fmu (in CPU cycles/s) as the MEC server m’s
computing resource allocated to serve the UE u, the time
consumed to execute the computation task of a UE u by the
MEC m can be formulated as
Tmu = x
m
u
duξu
fmu
, (2)
where xmu ∈ {0, 1} determines that the MEC server m serves
user u or not. Here, xmu = 1 means that the MEC server m
accepts to serve the user u, xmu = 0 otherwise. Note that at
each certain time, each MEC server only serves a UE, thus∑U
u=1 x
m
u = 1,∀m ∈M.
Reputation Evaluation Mechanism: The SDN controller is
responsible to aggregate all computation information of MEC
servers to evaluate the reputation score which determines that
which MEC server should be allocated more network resource
(i.e. hash power) according to the service latency. In specific,
an edge reputation score (Υm) is defined for completing a
computation task by a MEC server m, which is expressed
as Υm = tmdes/t
m
act where t
des and tact are desired service
latency and actual service latency, respectively. The MEC
server with a higher reputation score should be prioritized to
be allocated more resources (i.e. hash power) for joining the
mining process. Mathematically, the reputation score (Υm) of
the MEC server m can be calculated as
Υm =
tmdes
tmact
=
∑U
u=1 τu∑U
u=1 T
m
u
. (3)
Our reputation mechanism can help overcome the limitation
of the current works [11], [12], [16] in terms of mining
speed. Indeed, in such works, hash power is usually allocated
randomly to miners regardless of their contributions to the
computation offloading process. This can result in a case that
a certain miner spends more resource for task execution but
receives less hash power, which prevents it from participating
in the consensus process in the future. Consequently, less MEC
servers join the mining that adversely affects the blockchain-
based MEC system. By introducing a reputation mechanism,
we will encourage more MEC servers to solve the blockchain
consensus puzzle, which would accelerate the mining process
and ensure the robustness of the MEC system. In the next sec-
tion, we will analyze the relationship between the reputation
score and hash power allocation.
B. Block mining
As part of the blockchain network, MEC servers can act
as blockchain miners to join the consensus process in order
to perform mining tasks for extra profits. In the blockchain
network, MEC servers (miners) compete against each other to
become the first one to solve the mining puzzle. Each MEC
server m has a hash power, denoted as pm (Hash/sec). In our
design, the hash power of each MEC server is allocated by
the ESP provider according to its reputation score. In other
words, the MEC server with higher reputation score should
be allocated more hash power for its task execution efforts.
This mechanism is extremely important to motivate more
MEC servers to participate in the consensus process. In return,
they also receives benefits (i.e. mining reward) from joining
the consensus process. Thus, our solution can significantly
enhance the robustness of the edge blockchain system and
effectively solve the issue of a lack of miners for maintaining
the blockchain network.
Then, the relative hash power of the MEC server m to the
blockchain network can be defined as
µm =
pm
H
(4)
where H represents the total hash power of the blockchain
network which can be estimated through the compact status
reports from miners [18]. It can be seen that when µm
increases, the probability to achieve successful consensus
increases, which will increase the mining reward for the MEC
server m, accordingly.
In general, in order to mine successfully a block, two steps
are needed including the mining step and the propagation step.
In the mining step, the probability that the MEC server m
mines the block is proportional to its relative hash power
µm. The mined block is then propagated to the blockchain
network. However, there is a possibility that this MEC server
m propagates the mined block slower with other MEC servers
in the propagation step, which makes such a block likely
to be discarded from the blockchain. This issue is called as
orphaning [12], and this miner does not receive a reward for
its mining. According to [12], the orphaning probability is
approximated as Porphan = 1 − e−ηφ(bm), where η is a
constant mean value and set η = 1/600(sec) [14]. Further,
bm denotes the number of transactions contained in the block
that is mined by the miner m, and φ(bm) represents the block
propagation time.
Clearly, with a larger block size sm, the propagation time
required to reach a consensus of a block will be larger. As a
result, the probability of successful mining by miner m can
be expressed as
P = µm(1− Porphan) = µme−ηφ(sm). (5)
We denoteR as the reward of the first miner which achieves
consensus, then the expected mining reward of the MEC server
m can be calculated as
Rm = RP = Rµne−ηφ(sn). (6)
From our analysis, we can see that the performance of our
blockchain-based MEC system can be improved by maximiz-
ing the system revenue φu and mining reward Rm, while
minimizing the edge computation cost (i.e. execution latency
Tmu ). To achieve this goal, the decision-making process can
be taken into consideration. In specific, the user with higher
service demands should be selected (in the offloading process),
and the MEC server with a higher reputation score should
be allocated more computation resources (i.e. hash power).
Accordingly, the user selection and resource allocation should
be jointly considered. Motivated by this, in the following
section, we adopt a Deep Reinforcement Learning approach
to solve the formulated problem.
IV. DEEP REINFORCEMENT LEARNING APPROACH
In this section, we first introduce a reinforcement learning
method and propose a new DRL approach for our formulated
problem.
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Fig. 3: The detailed DRL framework for blockchain-based MEC
system.
A. Reinforcement Learning formulation
In our blockchain-empowered MEC system, the DRL unit
on the SDN controller acts as the agent which interacts closely
with the multi-user MEC environment to find an action a for
a state s using a policy pi as shown in Fig. 3. This policy is
defined as a mapping from the action to the state, i.e., pi(s) =
a. The main goal of the agent is to find an optimal policy pi,
aiming to maximize the total amount of award r over the long
run. To implement the RL-based algorithms, we first define
the specific state, action and reward for the proposed model.
1) State Space: The learning agent interacts with the en-
vironment to collect necessary information, including service
demands of all UEs (ξu,∀u ∈ U), reputation scores of all MEC
servers (Υm,∀m ∈ M), which are expressed by matrix SU
and SM , respectively. In specific, matrix SU can be defined
as
SU = [s1, s2, ..., su, ..., sU ], (7)
where su presents the service demand of the UE n. Mean-
while, matrix SM can be specified as
SM = [s1, s2, ..., sm, ..., sM ], (8)
where sm is the reputation score of the MEC server m. Thus,
the state space can be defined as
s = [SU , SM ]. (9)
2) Action Space: The learning agent needs to determine
which user equipment is served by MEC servers (user se-
lection) and how much mining computation resource (hash
power) is allocated to MEC servers. As a result, the action
space can be defined as
a =
[
xm1 x
m
2 ... x
m
u ... x
m
U
p1 p2 ... pm ... pM
]
, (10)
where xmu ∈ {0, 1} determines that the MEC server m serves
user u or not. Here, xmu = 1 means that the MEC server m
accepts to serve the user u, xmu = 0 otherwise. Moreover, p
m
is the hash power allocated to the MEC server m (pm < H).
3) Reward Function: The objective of the RL agent is
to find an optimal policy pi∗ which makes a decision a at
each state s to obtain a certain reward that needs to reflect
the objective of our DRL algorithm. This is to maximize the
mining reward Rm and service revenue φu while minimizing
the computation cost Tmu for the long run. Accordingly, we
define the expected system utility as the reward that the DRL
agent receives from the environment as
r = Epi,s
T∑
t=1
M∑
m=1
(Rm + φu − Tmu ),∀u ∈ U , (11)
where T is the time horizon of the optimization problem.
B. Proposed DRL-based algorithm
In this section, we present the design of the proposed DRL
algorithm for our MEC scheme.
1) Basics of DRL: To address the formulated MDP, RL-
based approaches can be used to obtain the sequence of actions
to maximize the long-term reward in (6). In RL, a learning
agent performs trial and error processes via jumping state by
state in the defined MDP by taking some actions to obtain
certain rewards. By continuously interacting with the MDP, the
agent can accumulate much experience over time for building
an optimal policy. Specifically, the state-action function can be
updated using the experience tuple of an agent (st, at, rt, st+1)
at each time step t as Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + ασt which is
called as Q-learning algorithm [8]. Here, σt = r(st, at) + γ ∗
maxQ(st+1, at+1)−Q(st, at) is the TD error which will be
zero for the optimal Q-value, α is the learning rate, and γ is
the discount factor between (0,1).
It is noted that such experiences are stored in a two-
dimensional action-state table, which may become infeasible
to solve problems with large state-action space. In our sce-
nario, for example, assuming the time horizon is 200 time
slots and 10 mobile users (MDs), our scheme has as many
as 10 ∗ 2005 states and 10 ∗ 22 actions associated with each
state, which is extremely large. Motivated by this, function
approximators such as a deep neural network (DNN) has been
proposed and proven success in recent works [13, 14]. In
DRL algorithms, the experience replay solution is employed
in the training phase with buffer B which stores experiences
et = (st, at, rt, st+1) at each time step t. A random mini-
batch of transitions (sj , aj , rj , sj+1) from the replay memory
is also selected to train the Q-network. Here the Q-network is
trained by iteratively updating the weight θ to minimize the
loss function, which is written as
L(θ) = E[rj + γminQ(sj+1, aj+1|θ′)−Q(sj , aj |θj))2]. (12)
However, the fact that the traditional DRL algorithm re-
quires exhaustive search via all actions and states, it does
not suit the high-dimensional problems like our offloading
problem. Furthermore, during the computation of Q function in
some MDP problems, it is unnecessary to estimate action and
state values at the same time, thus we can estimate separately
the action and state value functions.
2) Proposed double DQN algorithm: In conventional DQN,
we use the same samples from the replay memory to both
specify which action is the best and estimate this action value,
which leads to the large over-estimation of action values. To
solve this problem, Double DQN proposes the use of two value
functions with two sets of weights. One is utilized to determine
the action, while the other is used to evaluate its reward. The
double Q functions select and evaluate action values by the
new loss function as follows
Ldou(θ) = E[y
j
dou −Q(sj , aj |θj))2], (13)
where yjdou is specified as
yjdou = (r
j + γ.Q(sj+1,minaj+1Q(s
j+1, aj+1|θ), θ′). (14)
It is noting that the action choice is still based on the
weight θ, while the evaluation of the selected action relies on
the weight value θ′. This technique reduces over-estimation
problem and improves the overall performance of the learned
model, compared with the model that uses traditional Q-
learning. The details of the proposed algorithm are shown in
Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 The proposed DRL algorithm with Double DQN
1: Initialization:
2: Set replay memory D with capacity N
3: Initialize the deep Q network Q(s, a) with random weight
θ and θ′, initialize the exploration probability  ∈ (0, 1)
4: for episode = 1,..., M do
5: Initialize the state sequence s0
6: for t = 1, 2, ... do
7: /∗ ∗ ∗ Plan the offloading and mining∗ ∗ ∗/
8: Estimate the system state profile st = {SU , SM}
9: Select a random action at with probability , other-
wise at = argminQ(st, a, θ)
10: Perform the offloading process of trading, computa-
tion and mine the block
11: Observe and evaluate the system utility rt based on
(11) and next state st+1
12: /∗ ∗ ∗ Update ∗ ∗ ∗/
13: Store the experience (st, at, rt, st+1) into the mem-
ory D
14: Sample random mini-batch of state transitions
(sj , aj , rj , sj+1) from D
15: Calculate the target Q-value by (yjdou = r
j +
γ.Q(sj+1,minaj+1Q(s
j+1, aj+1|θ); θ′)
16: Perform a gradient descent step with the weight θj
on (yjdou −Q(sj , aj |θj))2 as the loss function
17: Train the deep Q-network with updated θ and θ′
18: end for
19: end for
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
algorithm through numerical simulations.
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Fig. 4: Comparisons of convergence performance.
TABLE I: Simulation parameters.
Parameter Value
Number of UEs U [5-30]
Number of MEC servers M 10
Task’s offloading data sizes du [1-5] MB [1]
Numbers of CPU cyles ξu [0.6-1.6] Gcyles [11]
The MEC server’s computing capability fmu 5 GHz [14]
The unit edge service price µ 0.15 token/Gcyles [6]
The hash power allocated to MEC servers pm [20-100] MHash/s [12]
Numbers of transactions per block (block size) bm [1-10]KB [16]
The reward of the first miner which achieves
consensus R
30 tokens [16]
A. Simulation settings
We consider a scenario with a maximum of 100 UEs and
10 MEC servers distributed over a 500m x 500m area. The
configurations for simulation parameters are listed in TABLE
I. For the proposed DRL algorithm, motivated by [15], the
proposed DNN structure includes an input layer, three hidden
layers (64, 32 and 32 neurons), and an output layer. The
discount factor γ equals 0.85; the replay memory capacity
and training batch size are set to 105 and 128, respectively.
The learning rate α is set to 0.01 to ensure stable and good
performance for the algorithm. Further, we prepared 100,000
storing history samples to train the deep network for user
selection and resource allocation decisions. Here, we employ
ReLU as the activation function in the hidden layers, while the
sigmoid activation function is utilized in the output layer to
relax the decision variables. We used the AdamOptimizer to
optimize the loss function. All simulations were implemented
in Python 3.6 with TensorFlow 2.0 [15] on a computer with
an Intel Core i7 4.7GHz CPU and 128 GB memory.
We compared our scheme (Proposed DRL) with the RL
scheme (using a basic Q-learning algorithm) [12] and the
classic DRL [13] (using a standard DQN algorithm). More-
over, genetic algorithm (GA), a common approach to solve
nonlinear integer programming problems, is also considered.
With the help of double DQN associated with appropriate
parameter settings, the proposed DRL scheme should achieve
the best performance, while the merit of other schemes can be
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Fig. 5: Average system utility versus numbers of UEs.
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shown via simulations.
B. Simulation Results
We verify the system utility performance of our scheme
and compare it with other baseline approaches. Then we also
analyze the optimization performance among schemes.
1) Convergence performance: We first evaluate the con-
vergence performance of learning algorithms, including the
proposed DRL, classic DRL and RL schemes for a blockchain
based MEC system with 10 MEC servers and 20 UEs. Fig. 4
shows the learning curves for total system utility obtained by
running the learning algorithms over 2000 timeslots. The result
shows that the total system utility is small at the beginning
of the learning process for all schemes. However, as the
number of timeslot increases, the total system utility of the
proposed DRL scheme increases rapidly and converges after
only 250 timeslots with high stability. An explanation is that
the proposed DRL scheme uses Double DQN that reduces
the overestimation of Q values and, as a result, accelerates
the learning process. Moreover, the use of two separate value
functions helps to better evaluate trained data for better algo-
rithm performance (i.e. system utility). Meanwhile, the classic
DRL algorithm using a traditional deep D-learning with no
further algorithm improvements converges slower (about 400
timeslots) with a lower system utility. The RL algorithm has
the lowest convergence performance, which is because that the
RL scheme with Q-learning always chooses system actions in
a greedy manner, leading to slow action value evaluation. The
comparison results verifies the superior performance of our
DRL scheme, compared to its counterparts.
2) System utility performance: We investigated the perfor-
mances of four algorithms in various metrics as shown in Figs.
5,6. In specific, in Fig. 5, we consider a MEC network with
10 MEC servers and a varying number of UEs from 5 to
30, and measure the average system utility. It is observed
that more UEs lead to a higher system utility due to the
increase of system revenue and blockchain reward (i.e. mining
profits). The GA scheme achieves the lowest utility in all
cases of UE numbers. The main reason behind that that the
higher number of UEs would result in a larger search space,
which makes the GA scheme actually inefficient in finding an
optimal optimization value and thus limits the performance
of the algorithm. The RL shows a better performance in
terms of higher system utility, compared with the GA scheme.
Meanwhile, for the two DRL approach, when the number of
UEs U is small, fewer training steps are needed to meet system
performance requirements, which leads to a similar system
utility. However, when U increases, the proposed DRL scheme
with the help of double DQN learning is the best with a larger
performance gap among all learning schemes and is much
better than the GA scheme.
Moreover, the Fig. 6 depicts the performance curves of av-
erage system utility with respect to the user service demands.
In this case, we consider a scenario with 10 MEC servers and
20 UEs, each UE has a service demand varying from 0.6 to 1.6
Gcyles. It can be seen that with higher service demands, the
incomes of the MEC system increase accordingly (as shown in
equation (1)), which leads to an increase of the overall system
utility although it also results in higher computation latency.
Again, among all schemes, the proposed DRL scheme with
a double DQN design exhibits the best performance with the
largest average system utility, followed by the classic DRL
scheme.
Next, we also evaluate the performance of the MEC system
by our design with the joint optimization of user selection and
resource allocation (i.e. power hash) versus the varying block
sizes. In particular, we highlight the merit of the proposed
scheme by comparing with the classic DRL scheme in terms
to three scenarios, namely the full design with taking both
user selection and resource allocation into consideration, the
scheme without resource allocation and the scheme without
user selection. As depicted in Fig. 7, our design with the
proposed DRL scheme associated with a joint optimization
of user selection and resource allocation yields the highest
performance in terms of system utility when varying block
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TABLE II: Comparison results of algorithm performances.
Schemes N =10 N=20 N=30ECL ART ECL ART ECL ART
GA 63.03 12804 89.05 18048 145.97 26889
RL [12] 61.54 29.12 84.21 131.02 119.34 538.33
Classic DRL [13] 59.67 26.09 80.90 127.71 110.38 478.19
Proposed DRL 53.42 21.54 74.09 122.38 99.05 445.63
sizes. The key reason is that when the larger block size means
that the MEC servers obtain more rewards via mining (based
on equation 6), which thus leads to a higher system utility.
Although the other schemes with the optimization of only
resource allocation or only user selection achieve lower system
utilities, our DRL scheme is much better than the traditional
DRL scheme, which shows the efficiency of our algorithm.
3) Optimization performance: Next, we evaluate the per-
formance of four algorithms through the average total edge
computation latency-ECL (in Equation 2, in second) for a
MEC network of 10 MEC servers and varying numbers of
UEs, and average algorithm running time-ART (CPU com-
putation time, in second) as presented in TABLE II. Note
that the ECL results are averaged over the runs of 100,000
history samples for offloading action generation and DNN
training. Overall, the ECL and ART increase rapidly in all
schemes when the number of UEs increases due to a larger
system state space and higher computing complexity that
needs to be solved. Compared to the learning schemes, the
GA algorithm consumes great computation resources, while its
ECL is also high in all cases. In particular, the proposed DRL
scheme achieves better ECL performances but requires less
execution latency than its counterparts, showing the minimal
computational complexity of our algorithm.
C. Smart contract performance
We further investigate the feasibility of our smart contract,
an important service in our BaaS model. Here, a trading
contract is used to perform resource trading for offloading as
mentioned in Section III.A. The contract mainly provides two
main functions as follows:
TABLE III: Smart contract cost test.
Contract functions Gas used Actual cost (ether) USD
CreationTrade() 170948 0.0034 0.6630
Trading() 3904827 0.07809 15.2275
Total 4075775 0.0815 15.8955
- CreationTrade(): This function includes user information
(Wu, Idu, PKu) and user u’s service information (including
the service demand ξu and service price µ). It initializes the
trading contract and runs it on blockchain for a ready execution
of new trading requests.
- Trading(): Based on user service demand ξu, the edge
service provider (MEC server) calculates the service cost that
the user u needs to pay. During Trading(), the user must
complete their payment by sending a certain coin from their
wallet (Wu) to the MEC server’s wallet address.
To evaluate the performance of the trading contract,
we implemented a real-world experiment with a simplified
blockchain-based MEC system according to our recent works
[10], [15]. Here, we employed Ethereum, a popular blockchain
platform for edge computing to create a blockchain network
where there are five smart phones acting as UEs and one MEC
server. The trading contract was written by Solidity program-
ming language with two functions as mentioned above. We
focus on evaluating the operation costs of contract functions
as listed in TABLE III.
Here, the cost is calculated in a gas unit and then converted
into ether (cost unit of Etherum blockchain) and US dollars
by using an exchange rate of 1 Gas ≈ 0.00000002 Ether and
1 Ether ≈ $195, according to [19]. We consider a realistic
scenario that some users join the blockchain network for
resource trading with the MEC server so that they can offload
data, and thus CreationTrade() and Trading() functions
need to be executed. All of these contract executions incur
operation costs and the users need to pay for their service
usage. From TABLE III, the amount of gas used for trading
services is 4075775 gas (15.8955 USD, ≈ 3.1791 USD per
user). Clearly, the financial cost for using our contract is low,
which demonstrates the practicality of the proposed contract-
based trading scheme.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have considered a multi-access edge
computing (MEC) network with blockchain for multi-users.
Our key focus is on the optimization of the performance
of the MEC system by maximizing edge service revenue
and blockchain mining reward and minimizing the service
computation latency with respect to constraints of user service
demands and hash power resources. Particularly, we leverage a
smart contract to support transparent resource trading for com-
putation offloading, while a reputation mechanism is designed
to accelerate the mining process. We have formulated the
user selection and resource allocation as a joint optimization
problem. Then, a novel deep reinforcement learning (DRL)
scheme using a double DQN algorithm is developed to solve
the proposed problem. We have validated the performances
of our design in various parameter settings, showing the
significant improvements to the proposed scheme, compared
with other baseline approaches in terms of much higher system
utility. System evaluations also proved that the proposed
algorithm achieved minimal computational complexity, and the
operation cost of the smart trading contract was low, showing
the efficiency of the proposed scheme.
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